Mirai

Time and Date of Activity: Primary window: 2026-07-11 16:52 UTC through 2026-07-12 06:11 UTC (the web exploitation from .64 and the SSH loader session from .230). Related activity from the same /24 continued on 2026-07-14 with the .243 Mirai Telnet sweep. This observation is a cluster rather than a single host. Four IPs in one /24 (94.154.43.0/24) worked in concert to stand up a fresh Mirai-variant IoT botnet, which I am calling titanjr after its payload naming. Unlike the RedTail loader I wrote up previously, which uploaded its binaries over SFTP, this operation split the work across the block: 94.154.43.64 ran the web-facing exploitation, 94.154.43.230 handled SSH and pulled the payload set, 94.154.43.192 served the payloads from an open directory, and 94.154.43.243 ran a Mirai Telnet sweep two days later. What earns this the final observation is that the payloads were actually captured (real hashes, not the empty stubs I see on most sessions) and the campaign was brand new: every sample was first seen on VirusTotal on 2026-07-11, one day before my sensor caught them. ...

OSINT enrichment for the RedTail SSH campaign: per-indicator attribution of six hashes (four RedTail ELF variants plus loader/installer scripts), VirusTotal detection context, and a triage recommendation. Companion appendix to the third attack observation.

A SSH-2.0-Go actor at 130.12.180.51 brute forced HoneyPi, then ran a two-stage shell loader, implanted an authorized_keys entry for persistence, and dropped six architecture-specific RedTail payloads over SFTP. Same bundle seen from a second IP two weeks earlier points to shared tooling.